Conflict Analysis of Liberia, and Analysis of Issues and Implications for Future Swedish Development Co-operation by Greene, Owen J. et al.
Sida Helpdesk on Human Security 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conflict Analysis of Liberia, and Analysis of 
Issues and Implications for Future Swedish 
Development Co-operation 
 
Authors 
Owen Greene 
with Hannes Berts  and Sarah Njeri. 
  
December 2015 
 
Sida-helpdesk@ lists.brad.ac.uk 
 2 
 
Sida Helpdesk Report 
 
Conflict Analysis of Liberia, and Analysis 
of Issues and Implications for Future 
Swedish Development Co-operation 
 
Section A 
 
Requested by Sida 
The Swedish government plans to develop and to approve a new strategy for Swedish development 
cooperation with Liberia during the upcoming months. As part of the process of operationalizing the 
strategy, Sida will be given the task to develop an implementation plan, analysing and proposing how 
the expected targets should be reached and through which kind of contributions and cooperation 
methods this could be done. In order to analyse factors in the country that have the potential of 
negatively or positively affecting the results of the Swedish development cooperation, as well as to 
program the development cooperation in a way that prevents conflicts or doing harm to the conflict 
situation, the Embassy in Monrovia has identified the need for a comparative, analytical study of 
power relations in Liberia from an integrated conflict perspective.  
In this context, the Helpdesk is requested to conduct a two-fold assignment: 
1. A mapping of available analyses with relevance to the conflict and/or power relations in 
Liberia, summarize them briefly, analyse their current relevance, and develop a synthesized, 
analytical summary of the conclusions. 
  
2. A discussion of the challenges and priorities for Sweden and other donors to design and 
implement co-operation programmes in Liberia in ways that maintain focus on addressing 
fragility issues; and an analysis of potential positive or negative effects of the identified 
power relations/conflict dimensions on the specific areas of work of the Swedish development 
cooperation – i.e. democratic governance and human rights, human security, gender, and 
sustainable economic development.  
 
The aim is for the study to contribute to the Embassy’s task of analysing development challenges in 
relation to the situation in Liberia, to identify opportunities for conflict-sensitive development and 
peacebuilding, as well as killing factors. Particular concern should be taken to dynamics around the 
2017 elections and the UNMIL transition. Sida will provide the Helpdesk with some available 
documentation or guidance to help to clarify which issues and areas of programming (under the main 
results areas indicated above) presently appear to be under most active consideration for inclusion in 
Sweden’s forthcoming strategy. 
 
Authors and contacts: Owen Greene (o.j.greene@Bradford.ac.uk), with inputs from Hannes Berts  
and Sarah Njeri.  
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Section B: 
Conflict Analysis Mapping of Liberia, 
and Analysis of Issues and Implications for 
Future Swedish Development Co-operation 
 
Introduction 
In this Section B we present our mapping of existing recent conflict analyses and studies 
relating conflict risk factors in contemporary Liberia (which are detailed in the Annex 1 
attachment ), and also our analysis of the opportunities and challenges that the existing 
studies and other knowledge imply for Sweden in implementing its future strategy for 
development co-operation with Liberia.   
Our Report starts with a short summary of our main findings and conclusions. Next, we 
describe our mapping of recent existing conflict analyses and studies on conflict factors, and 
clarify the criteria for selecting the 15 studies that we detail in the Liberia conflict analysis 
Mapping Annex which is submitted alongside this Report (and full versions of which are also 
provided alongside this Report). We then present our short synthesis of the main conclusions 
on conflict risks and peace-building opportunities that can be drawn from the large number of 
relevant recent conflict-relevant studies of Liberia. These provide a basis for the discussion in 
the remaining sections of this Report. 
The next section identifies and discussed some key challenges and opportunities arising from 
state fragilities and conflict risks for Sweden and its international partners in their future 
cooperation strategy and programmes in Liberia; and then highlights some overall 
implications for Sweden to take into account when developing its next strategy for 
development co-operation with Liberia. Some key aspects of these issues and challenges are 
then specifically discussed in the following section.  
Summary 
There are many existing publicly-available studies and analyses on conflict and conflict risk 
factors in Liberia that have been published over the last seven years, including a few 
reasonably systematic overall conflict analyses, the full range of which we have aimed to use 
and take into account in the preparation of this present Helpdesk Report. In this mapping of 
recent analyses, we have aimed to focus particularly on relatively recent reports (i.e. from 
2011/15, and as far as possible since 2014). However, it is important to note that there appear 
to be very few recent (i.e. since 2012) systematic and comprehensive conflict analyses of 
Liberia. There are however, many substantial reports on specific issues related to particular 
risk factors. We have selected 15 studies for inclusion in our mapping, which are detailed in 
the Mapping Annex.  
Overall, there is wide consensus across nearly all good studies that, although Liberia has 
made substantial progress in many ways since the 2003 peace agreement, the country remains 
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highly fragile and conflict-prone. A combination of powerful underlying or structural conflict 
risk factors persists, and there are powerful local, national and regional actors and networks 
that could in certain contexts rapidly develop interests and capacities to use or provoke armed 
violence.  There are many on-going local conflicts, often associated with land tenure and use, 
which continue to have the potential for escalation or instrumentalisation by divisive forces.  
The main explanations for the last decade of overall peace in Liberia emphasise the 
importance of key conflict prevention factors. These include: war exhaustion; wide-spread 
popular hopes for poverty reduction and a better society; the heavy presence of UNMIL and 
high international donor support; the skilful political and economic management under 
President Johnson-Sirleaf of a complex combination of informal networks, clientelist 
relationships and state institutions; and the relative stability of the wider Mano River region.   
On the basis of this widely-supported overall conflict analysis of contemporary Liberia, most 
reports and studies cautiously conclude that, despite many encouraging reforms and positive 
programmes over the last decade, Liberia remains highly fragile; there is still widespread 
insecurity from violence, intimidation and lack of access to justice; and the underlying 
vulnerabilities to large-scale violent conflict persist. In developing its next strategy for 
development co-operation for Liberia, Sweden needs at least to fully take into account these 
conclusions. This implies at minimum ensuring and promoting conflict sensitivity of all of the 
polices, programmes and activities that Sweden supports over the next five years, and 
specifically aims to address factors contributing to state fragility as well as to poverty 
reduction and development. 
However, the Helpdesk’s analysis of the range of existing studies of Liberia is that a strong 
case can be made that vulnerabilities to violent conflict could significantly increase during 
the next five years. The reason for this is that some or all of the important conflict mitigation 
factors noted above are likely to either decline or come under serious challenges over the next 
five years. During the same period, the many positive policies and development underway are 
unlikely to bear sufficient fruit to proportionately improve underlying resilience against 
conflict. This is not, of course, in any way a statement that violent conflict is likely to resume 
in Liberia – on the contrary, this scenario appears to be quite preventable. However, it is 
analysis that indicates increased risks of violent conflict during the next five years. This 
implies that Sweden and its international and local partners need also to devote serious and 
enhanced attention to conflict prevention, peace-building, and confidence and security 
building measures. If this argument is accepted, it should have implications for Sweden’s 
strategy for development co-operation as well as for Sweden’s wider foreign and security 
policy engagement with Liberia.  
In this context, we particularly highlight the significance of the 2017 Presidential election 
process and outcomes, and the ongoing drawdown of UNMIL which is presently planned for 
completion by the end of 2016. In some respects, these can be considered as possible trigger 
factors from a conflict perspective, and in other ways as changes to existing mechanisms for 
conflict management and resilience. Implications for Sweden’s future assistance to Liberia 
include consideration of active measures to:  
 maintain deterrence against instrumental use of armed violence, and public 
confidence in overall security  during and after UNMIL drawdown; and  
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 Ensure security and prevent violence during elections, and help to prevent damaging 
fragmentation and division of governing networks in the post-2017 governance 
system while taking opportunities to further enhance accountability and the roles of 
legitimate state institutions and procedures in decisions on use of public funds and 
resources. 
We then discuss the following issues and processes as particularly relevant for conflict 
prevention, conflict resilience and conflict sensitivity: land conflicts and natural resource 
governance and reform; the ongoing political decentralisation and de-concentration of service 
delivery processes;  security sector reform and access to justice; gender equality and tackling 
GBV; anti-corruption, accountability and democratic governance; peace-building and 
reconciliation initiatives in the context of societal divisions and displaced people; and 
addressing vulnerabilities to transnational trafficking and crime, and to external economic 
shocks in the context of reduce global commodity prices. Each of these is important as 
conflict risk factors and as opportunities to enhance resilience against conflict in Liberia, and 
have implications for programmes supported under Sweden’s next development co-operation 
strategy.  
Mapping of Available Analyses Relating To Conflict and/or 
Power Relations in Liberia.  
The Helpdesk is aware of a large number of publicly-available studies and analyses on 
conflict, conflict risk factors and power relations in Liberia. These have informed the various 
Helpdesk Reports and assignments that have been prepared for Sida and the Swedish 
Embassy in recent years, including the Helpdesk’s Political Economy Analysis of Liberia 
(2012).
1
   In this context, for this present assignment we considered a large number of 
relevant reports and studies that have been published over the last seven years or so, the full 
range of which we have aimed to use and take into account in the preparation of this present 
Helpdesk Report.  
In this present mapping of recent analyses, we have aimed to focus particularly on relatively 
recent reports (i.e. from 2011/15, and as far as possible since 2014). It is important to note 
that there appear to be very few recent (i.e. since 2012) systematic and comprehensive 
conflict analyses of Liberia. Those that exist are basically updates or reviews of more detailed 
and systematic studies between 2005-2010. There are however, many substantial reports 
since 2011/12 on specific issues related to particular risk factors.  
We have selected 15 studies for inclusion in our mapping, which are detailed in the Annex. 
We have included a recent overall conflict analysis and a recent Fragility Assessment of 
Liberia. We have then included recent good or stimulating studies on a range of the key issue 
areas that are particularly relevant from a conflict or a power/political economy perspective. 
In most of these issue areas, there were several good studies that were eligible for inclusion, 
and thus qualitative and sometimes difficult decisions had to be taken on which to select. As 
a rule, we assume that the Swedish Embassy and Sida is already fully aware of all official 
UN, Government of Liberia, or World Bank documents and reports, and also generally 
                                                          
1
 Helpdesk on Human Security, Political Economy Analysis of Liberia – desk study, final Report submitted to 
Sida 14 December 2012, pp49. 
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familiar with many of the good reports published on or before 2010, and also reports directly 
commissioned by Swedish government agencies. Thus we preferred more recent good 
‘independent’ reports. Most of these summarised and explicitly built upon previously (i.e. 
prior to 2010) published major studies, and thus also help to brief Sida on such earlier works. 
We also sought to represent some diversity of perspectives, but with less success. On re-
reading by the Helpdesk, several potential candidate studies prepared by local or West 
African institutions turned out to be more derivative or less reliable than originally hoped. 
Note that in one case, a series of six recent briefs are submitted as one overall study – which 
we included because we wanted to include at least one study focussing directly n very recent 
land reforms in Liberia designed to facilitate community land tenure, and in combination 
these six briefs (prepared for USAID) appeared to be the best available .  
Note that there are numerous recent commentaries and initial about the impacts and potential 
implications of the recent Ebola epidemic. We do not doubt the major impact of this epidemic 
and the likelihood of enduring impacts. However, we judge that many of the discussions of 
longer-term impacts remain highly speculative and also assume that the Swedish Embassy in 
Monrovia is already relatively well-informed about this specific issue area. For this reason, 
we have not included a study of the Ebola epidemic in Liberia and its implications from a 
conflict perspective in our limited selection of 15 studies.  
In the Annex, we have also separately listed directly-relevant Helpdesk reports submitted to 
Sida/Swedish Embassy since 2012, for ease of reference and access. As requested, full 
versions of all of the 15 selected studies are submitted in association with this Report, as are 
the Helpdesk reports. 
 
Synthesis of Findings of Available Studies  
The literature on Liberia is large and diverse, and there are many disputes and uncertainties 
on detailed but important issues. Nevertheless, in our judgement, overall, there is wide 
consensus across nearly all good studies on the key issues and factors relating to state 
fragility, conflict risk factors, and main characteristics of governance and political-economic 
relationships in contemporary. These are reflected in the analyses in the studies selected for 
the mapping (as outlined above), and synthesised for example, in the GSRDC conflict 
analysis (2014); Helpdesk Political Economy Analysis (2012) and Workshop Report (2013); 
Liberia Fragility Assessment (2012) and USAID ICAF Report (2010).
2
.  
Thus overall, there is wide consensus across nearly all publically available good studies that, 
although Liberia has made substantial progress in many ways since the 2003 peace 
agreement, the country remains highly fragile and conflict-prone. There are continuing 
                                                          
2
 Two of which are included in the Mapping  and a further two also provided in Mapping Annex for this 
Helpdesk Report: S. Herbert, Conflict Analysis of Liberia, GSDRC, University of Birmingham, UK, Feb 2014; 
New Deal, Liberia Fragility Assessment, Sept 2012; Helpdesk on Human Security, Political Economy Analysis 
of Liberia – desk study, submitted 14 Dec 2012, 49pp; Helpdesk on Human Security; Priorities for Addressing 
Fragility of Liberia: assessing the implications of Liberia Political Economy Analysis for EU Donor 
Programmes and Political Engagement; Workshop Report, January 2013, 15 pp. The fifth study is A, 
Paczinsnka, Liberia ICAF Report, USAID, Washington DC, May 2010, which did not make the final mapping 
selection due to necessarily difficult selection decisions and its relatively older publication date.  
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powerful drivers and characteristics of fragility
3
. Associated with these, a combination of 
powerful underlying or structural conflict risk factors persists, and there are powerful local, 
national and regional actors and networks that could in certain contexts rapidly develop 
interests and capacities to use or provoke armed violence.  There are many on-going local 
conflicts, often associated with land tenure and use, which continue to have the potential for 
escalation or instrumentalisation by divisive forces. 
Liberia as a fragile state 
In most respects, Liberia has been a deeply fragile state throughout most of its history as an 
independent state. These characteristics were important contributing factors for the Liberian 
civil wars 1989-2003, and in turn were deeply re-inforced by these wars, with strong legacies 
for contemporary Liberia. The concept of fragility continues to be framed in a variety of 
ways. But if we refer to the five dimensions highlighted in the ‘New Deal’s Peace Building 
and State building Goals (PSG), there is wide consensus (including the Government of 
Liberia itself) that Liberia faces profound challenges. 
PSG 1 Legitimate politics (foster inclusive political settlements and conflict resolution):  
there has been substantial progress since 2005 towards democratisation and an opening of 
political space for civil societies and political parties, including establishment of associated 
institutions and progressive policies, and a series of reasonably fair and violence-free 
electoral cycles. Nevertheless, in practice government and power remains relatively 
concentrated in the elite-group informal networks, and clientalist or neo-patrimonial 
relationships that both parallel and penetrate formal executive, legislative and judicial 
institutions. ‘Big man’ politics appears to continue to dominate at local and national levels, 
and many powerful figures during the civil wars continue to hold influential positions. A 
decentralisation of government process has been agreed and initiated, but it is at its early 
stages and in practice power, influence and resources remain concentrated in Monrovia. A 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission operated up to 2010, but very controversially and, 
moreover, very few of its recommendations have been implemented. A number of 
government and civil society initiatives for conflict resolution and reconciliation have been 
implemented, but in the above context progress has actually been very limited.  
This issue area provides an example of where there is wide uncertainty and dispute about the 
details but consensus on the big points. There are differences about the detail of present 
configurations of informal networks, ‘big-man’ politics and clientalist relationships that are 
highly influential in government decisions on allocation of public funds, resources and 
natural resource tenure, rights or concessions – and also about the extent to which these have 
changed over the last decade. Nevertheless, there is virtual consensus that such networks 
exist, are complex, and are highly influential in government and governance in Liberia. In 
this context, for example, it is hard for outsiders reliably to assess the extent to the 
democratically-elected government under President Johnson-Sirleaf has been obliged by the 
realities of local power relationships to tolerate slow or unbalanced implementation of 
desirable reforms and wide corruption, or whether part of the explanation lies also in active 
                                                          
3
 As discussed, for example, in the Fragility Assessment for Liberia 2012 (details in Mapping Annex) prepared in 
the context of the international ‘New Deal’ process for state-building and peace-building. 
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exploitation by the government of such clientalism.  Judgments on such issues often 
ultimately still have to boil down to questions of trust, or lack of pragmatic alternatives.  
PSG 2 Security (security conditions; capacity and accountability; and performance and 
responsiveness of security institutions): Studies confirm widespread perceptions of successful 
stabilisation and prevention of substantial armed conflict or political violence over the last 
decade, leading to increased public perceptions of improved security. One important point of 
progress appears to be increasing disconnection between intimidation and violence in Liberia 
and Liberian state executive and security agencies (ODI, 2015).   
Across Liberia, in both rural and urban areas, there are continuing high levels of criminal and 
local violence - often associated with land or other natural resource disputes – and gender 
based violence. There is some evidence that levels of such violence are gradually decreasing, 
except in relation to land conflicts and GBV. For these latter two types or contexts of 
violence, complex local conflicts over land and natural resource tenure and access combine 
with frequent disputes between local communities with national or international companies 
who have been allocated disputed land concessions; while GBV continues to be widespread. 
The main factors contributing to management and reductions in violence and insecurity 
appear to be the effectiveness and increased space of a plurality of local informal security 
providers; a relatively stable overall political settlement; high international donor support; 
and the capabilities and wide presence of UNMIL. Security sector reform processes have 
made progress in relation to the army, police and border agencies; but it is not clear that this 
has yet made a significant and sustainable difference to provision of, and confidence in, 
formal security provision. They appear to be highly dependent of UNMIL support, and also 
have relatively low presence outside Monrovia and a few other centres (for example, only 
23% of the Liberian National Police are presently stationed outside Monrovia).  
There is continuing high insecurity and violent land conflicts  in border regions (particularly 
with Cote D’Ivoire), and most analysts agree that there is potential for rapid re-mobilisation 
of armed groups if powerful Liberian actors decide that the political settlement is no longer 
working for them.     
PSG 3 Justice (conditions; capacity and accountability; and performance and responsiveness 
of justice institutions): Some progress has been made through large investments and development 
programmes in the justice sector by the international community since the end of the conflict. But 
progress is very limited. Formal state courts have never been a part of the social fabric in rural 
Liberia. Traditional or informal justice and dispute-resolution mechanisms have long been the 
dominant justice system in both rural and urban Liberia, and are still either the preferred or 
only realistic option or resolving disputes for most Liberians.  
Traditional and customary courts are now formally recognised in the Liberian Constitution and in 
other national legislation, and perhaps the most promising donor-supported progress in recent years 
has been achieved in the area of improving linkages between local customary and formal mechanisms 
at local levels. However, it is important to note that in many areas both formal and informal justice 
mechanisms can be dominated by the interests of powerful local actors. This limits fairness and local 
confidence, and helps to explain why so many land disputes become violent.  Moreover, women, girls 
and marginalised ethnic groups have particularly limited access to justice,  
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PSG 4 Economic Foundations (productive resources and prospects for growth; level of 
economic diversification; natural resource management; jobs, livelihoods and private sector 
development). The civil wars caused immense economic damage and impoverishment. Since 
2003 and in the context of successful stabilisation and a relatively secure environment, 
Liberian GDP has on average increased at an impressive annual rate of between 5-10%, 
mainly through investments in natural resource extraction and commercial agriculture, 
international aid, and remittances.  
 
However, this wealth has been extremely unevenly distributed. Natural resource governance 
is generally poor and highly contested. Despite national aggregated economic progress, the 
great majority of the population remains impoverished, and in 2015 Liberia still ranks 175 
out of 186 countries in the UNDP Human Development Index. Unemployment or partial 
employment rates remain very high and educational levels of the majority of the population 
remains very low. Employment and other opportunities for most of the youth population 
remain particularly poor, leading to increasing levels of frustration and alienation. Many 
argue that economic conditions for the majority of Liberians have not significantly improved 
since the 2003 Comprehensive Peace Agreement. This is in the context of increasing 
accumulation and use of wealth amongst Liberian elite groups.  
 
The recent falls in global commodity prices, associated with a slowdown in China and some 
other economies, is impacting on Liberian national GDP, making it very likely that Liberia’s 
impressive annual growth rates noted above will come to an end over the next few years. This 
is likely to represent an external economic shock which will severally test the country’s 
resilience. This will add to the political, security and other areas of fragility noted above and 
below, through 2017 and beyond.  
 
PSG 5 Public Revenues and Services (revenues; public administration; service delivery): 
there have been very substantial policies, institutional reforms and programmes to improve 
public administration, financial management and revenues, and the quality and scale of public 
services, supported largely through major international donor and technical support 
programmes in active partnership with the Government of Liberia. These have established 
many progressive initiatives and reforms. Substantial efforts have been made to meet major 
capacity gaps and to improve technical expertise and systems. Deconcentration of service 
delivery to enhance local accountability and responsiveness is an important objective of the 
decentralisation process launched in 20012/13.  
 
However, progress has been patchy at best. There are a range of different explanations for 
this, One, which has wide currency amongst the Liberian public, is that widespread 
corruption, nepotism and clientalist relationships has undermined or diminished effective 
negotiation of revenues from major commercial natural resource concessions and also 
effective distribution of resources for services.  
 
Impact of Ebola Virus Epidemic: The Ebola outbreak in March of 2014, led to an epidemic 
which led to up to 5,000 people’s deaths, left many survivors traumatised and destitute, and 
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demonstrated the lack of capacity and resilience of most Liberian state institutions and 
services. At the end of 2015, the Liberian epidemic has ended, and the country is moving 
towards becomig ’ebola-free’. The longer term implications are yet to become clear, and 
much of the speculation during 2014-15  is dubious. But one major lesson is the importance 
of increasing Liberia’s resilience against ’shocks’. This has direct implications for the health 
sector, but also much more widely to enhance societal and conflict resilience.   
 
Conflict analysis of contemporary Liberia 
 
As noted above, there is wide consensus across available studies about the conflict risks 
factors in contemporary Liberia. In summary, a combination of powerful underlying or 
structural conflict risk factors persists, and there are powerful local, national and regional 
actors and networks that could in certain contexts rapidly develop interests and capacities to 
use or provoke armed violence.  There are many on-going local conflicts, often associated 
with land tenure and use, which continue to have the potential for escalation or 
instrumentalisation by divisive forces. We now briefly summarise the main conflict risk 
factors that are widely identified.  
The underlying or structural factors that contribute to conflict risks in Liberia have remained 
similar for more than a decade; and overlap substantially with fragile state characteristics 
outlined above. They include: 
 Poor governance often dominated by informal elites networks and patronage systems 
 Relatively weak and low capacity state institutions, and limited state-society ‘’social 
contract’ 
 Fragile democratisation process, with limited accountability and responsiveness 
 Widespread and persistent extreme poverty, alongside emergence of wealthy elites 
 Unresolved historical grievances 
 Substantial societal divisions, including Monrovia – rural and ethnic divisions 
 Bad natural resource (including land) governance, including unclear and contested 
tenure 
 Weak or biased dispute settlement systems and inadequate access to justice 
 Widespread corruption, undermining public revenues, service delivery, and natural 
resource governance 
 Widespread human insecurity from violence and intimidations, including wide 
violence associated with land conflict community violence, crime and GBV 
 Weak national security systems (army, police, border controls), with weak public trust 
and high dependency on international support 
 High unemployment, particularly youth unemployment and frustrated expectations 
 Vulnerability to mobilisation of armed groups if powerful local and national actors 
perceive this to suit their interests 
 Insecure and fragile Mano River sub-region, with borderland insecurity and conflicts 
 Vulnerability to possible increased penetration by transnational crime or trafficking 
networks. 
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 There are also a wide variety of relevant actors, whose capacities, interests, and relationships 
are examined in the range of available studies – often in relation to one particular sector or 
risk factors. These include, state leaders and institutions; customary authorities and traditional 
leaders; business and private sector, civil society groups, expatriate Liberians; international 
donors; the UN and UNMIL, international companies, mainly  the natural resource extraction 
and commercial agricultural sectors; civil society organisations; political parties, bush 
societies (such as the Sande society).  
Since 2005, civil society and democratic institutional actors have been relatively empowered. 
However, there is wide agreement that the primary actors that tend to dominate outcomes 
continue to comprise of informal, political or identity group networks dominated by powerful 
local or national individuals. Politics and political economic processes in Liberia continue to 
be highly personalised, with outcomes determined by shifting coalitions of ‘big men’ and 
their clientalist networks. These shifting coalitions around ‘big individuals’ navigate the 
institutions and structural conditions in Liberia in order to defend and pursue their perceived 
interests.  
Experience over the last decade indicates this combination of structures and actors is 
relatively open and can flexibly accommodate significant changes, including democratisation 
processes and progressive reforms to government policies and programmes. However, it has 
also proved highly resilient, and capable of co-opting or instrumentalising reforms or donor-
supported programmes.  
Trigger factors for conflict or violence include: disputes over tenure or rights to grant 
concessions over land or other natural resource; escalation of local violence to involve inter-
community or identity groups conflicts; elections; access to corruption opportunities; and 
borderland conflicts,   
In this context, these analyses explain the continued risks of conflict in Liberia.  
Understanding recent resilience against large scale conflict in Liberia 
In order to assess overall risks and drivers of violent conflict. It is important also to examine 
sources of resilience against violent conflict. Reviewing the many vulnerabilities and conflcit 
risk factors outlined above, it is reasonable to ask why the overall security situation in Liberia 
has remained quite stable over the last decade,  
  
The main explanations for the last decade of overall peace in Liberia emphasise the 
importance of a combination of two types of factors. Firstly, the confidence-building benefits 
of an improved political and security environment and a range of positive policy initiatives 
and government commitments that help to promote confidence in the future even if they have 
not yet delivered widespread public benefits. Secondly, some very important conflict 
prevention factors, which have mitigated the risks and drivers of violent conflict.  
These powerful conflict prevention factors include:  
 war exhaustion;  
 wide-spread popular hopes for poverty reduction and a better society;  
 the heavy presence of UNMIL and high international donor support;  
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 the skilful political and economic management under President Johnson-Sirleaf of a 
complex combination of informal networks, clientelist relationships and state 
institutions; and  
 the relative stability of the wider Mano River region.   
 
On balance, the second set of conflict mitigation factors appear to be more powerful that the 
first.  
On the basis of this widely-supported overall conflict analysis of contemporary Liberia, most 
reports and studies cautiously conclude that, despite many encouraging reforms and positive 
programmes over the last decade, Liberia remains highly fragile; there is still widespread 
insecurity from violence, intimidation and lack of access to justice; and the underlying 
vulnerabilities to large-scale violent conflict persist.  
Increased risks of violent conflict during 2016-20 
However, the Helpdesk’s analysis of the range of existing studies of Liberia is that a strong 
case can be made that vulnerabilities to violent conflict could significantly increase during 
the next five years. The reason for this is that some or all of the important conflict mitigation 
factors noted above are likely to either decline or come under serious challenges over the next 
five years. During the same period, the many positive policies and development underway are 
unlikely to bear sufficient fruit to proportionately improve underlying resilience against 
conflict. This is not, of course, in any way a statement that violent conflict is likely to resume 
in Liberia – on the contrary, this scenario appears to be quite preventable. However, it is an 
analysis that indicates increased risks of violent conflict during the next five years. 
If we consider the main factors that have mitigated risks of violent conflict over the last 
decade, it seems very likely that the ‘war exhaustion’ factor is weakening, particularly in the 
context of a youthful population, and previous high public hopes for a major ‘peace dividend’ 
involving rapid reductions in poverty and marginalisation have substantially declined. The 
Mano River sub-region remains reasonably stable, but risks of volatility remain at least 
substantial for the foreseeable future, at least in Guinea and Cote D’Ivoire.  
In this context, we particularly highlight the significance of the other two factors: 2017 
Presidential election process and outcomes, and the ongoing drawdown of UNMIL which is 
presently planned for completion by the end of 2016. In some respects, these can be 
considered as possible trigger factors from a conflict perspective, and in other ways as 
changes to existing mechanisms for conflict management and resilience. We now consider 
each of these two factors in a little more detail.  
The 2017 Elections and their challenges to overall conflict resilience 
In Liberia, the history of “democracy” is not characterized by bitter electoral violence, but is 
punctuated with notorious electoral malpractices.  However, the elections on November 23, 
2005, were the first truly legitimate and relatively fair elections in national history. Analysts 
argue that the process owed a great deal to the international support and oversight. The time 
between the signing of the CPA and demobilization was precarious, and many assessed the 
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relative success of the process to be due to a combination of mobilizing social networks 
within Liberia and international support and oversight. 
During the last national elections in 2011, the presidential runoff that took place was marred 
by the CDC boycott, violence, and low voter turnout. These events exposed deep divisions 
within Liberian society and wide feelings of exclusion.  
The next national elections in 2017 will without doubt be an important milestone in the 
development of democracy in Liberia. In addition to the process helping to more deeply 
embed national democratic electoral institutions and expectations in Liberia, there will 
inevitably be a major transfer of government power. President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf is 
limited to two six-year terms in office, which she will have served by 2017.  Thus she will 
either be replaced by her Unity Party leadership successor (probably present Vice President 
Joseph Boakal), or the leader of the main opposition party (probably but not inevitably the 
Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)).  
These democratic changes of government are welcome and important. However, there are 
realistic concerns that the 2017 elections could pose significant challenges for resilience 
against conflict in Liberia. The most straightforward of these are the risks of electoral 
violence in 2017. The more complex challenges relate to the implied change in the networks 
of informal networks and clientalism and formal government.   
It is important to recognise that UNMIL forces and logistic capacities played important 
security and stabilisation during 2011 elections, and also contributed to context in which 
opposition parties ultimately accepted the result. UNMIL drawdown (see below) means that 
it cannot be expected to play the same roles in 2017. In this context, for example, the 
Supreme Court Chief Justice Francis S. Korkpor has re-iterated his call for UNMIL to stay to 
provide security during the 2017 general elections. Similar sentiments were expressed by 
President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf who though reaffirming her government's commitment to 
implement UNMIL drawdown plans she was fully aware of the security vacuum that will be 
created and the election challenges in 2017.  
As UNMIL gradually winds down its operations in Liberia over the next two years, there are 
wide and justified calls for special internationally-supported security arrangements to be in 
place to help to manage security in the lead-up, during and after the elections at least until a 
new democratically-elected government is securely in place. Pragmatically these could best 
be based on residual UNMIL capacities, supplemented by additional resources and capacities. 
But at present plans for such security arrangements appear, on the basis of our information, to 
be vague and uncertain.   
The deeper challenges arise from the fact that stable governance in Liberia has depended 
importantly of President Johnson-Sirleaf’s skilful management of a combination of informal 
networks, clientalism and formal legislative and government institutions, as discussed above. 
Without strong pressure and support, it is not clear that her successor as President will be able 
and willing to reduce reliance on such informal networks and clientalism. On the contrary, 
there appears to be a risk that the successor may find it very hard to retain the power and 
authority of the Presidency, or may come to rely on a narrower of more sectarian set of 
networks, with enduring impacts on resilience against re-emergence of violent conflict.  
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Such risks are inevitable in Liberia in its present situation, and are in many ways an 
unavoidable challenge that needs to be addressed if Liberia is to move out of fragility. 
However, it is important to take measures to reduce the risks of serious setbacks.  
UNMIL Drawdown and its implications for conflict resilience 
After the signing of the August 2003 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, on September 19, 
2003, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1509, establishing the UN Mission in 
Liberia (UNMIL), which was first deployed in October 2003.  It is a multidimensional 
peacekeeping operation in response to human rights and governance issues in post-war 
Liberia.  Thus UNMIL’s mandate includes the following elements  
 Enabling the transition of full security responsibility to the Liberia National Police by 
strengthening its capabilities; 
 Promoting the enhanced respect for human rights; 
 Supporting national processes of national reconciliation,  constitutional reform and 
decentralization;  
 Enhancing support for security sector and rule of law reforms; 
 Supporting the participation of women in conflict prevention, conflict resolution and 
peacebuilding; 
 Enhancing cooperation with the United Nations Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) 
for the stabilization of the border area;  
 Coordinating and collaborating with the Peacebuilding Commission on its 
engagement in Liberia. 
 
With the end of large-scale violent conflict and establishment of democratic and functioning 
governments in Liberia since 2003, the United Nations Security Council decided on phased 
withdrawal of the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). This process was proposed to be a 
gradual drawdown of peacekeepers from 15,000 in the aftermath of the civil war. The first 
scaled down to around 8,000 between 2007 and 2010. In September 2012, the U.N. Security 
Council decided to reduce further the number UNMIL troops by 4,200. On August 12, 2013 
Security Council Resolution 2116 extended the mandate for UNMIL until September 30th, 
2014, during which time the Mission would continue its military drawdown. Subsequently, 
the drawdown period has been further extended. The present plan is that by June 2016, there 
will be a reduced strength of 1,240 UNMIL military personnel and some 606 police 
personnel. Equally, the Mission’s civilian capacity will be rationalized, in accordance with its 
streamlined substantive mandate. UNMIL’s approach has been to increase its police presence 
in Liberia to support the Liberia National Police. This includes UNMIL’s capacity to provide 
a quick and effective response to any security incidents.  The drawdown is aimed at 
transferring security responsibilities to the Government of Liberia.  
There are widely-recognised risks associated with UNMIL’s drawdown that could jeopardize 
the peacebuilding gains achieved. In December 2012 the Government of Liberia requested a 
slower phased withdrawal citing that the departure of UNMIL would create human and 
logistical gaps for the Government of Liberia to fill.  However in March 2015, the GoL has 
reportedly approved a detailed security transition plan that will enable the country to assume 
full responsibility for all facets of its security by 30 June 2016, the deadline set by the 
Security Council. According to the Helpdesk’s understanding, UNMIL staff and their 
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counterparts at the UN in New York are also aware of these risks, but feel that there is 
nevertheless no option other than to proceed for the time being according to the declared 
draw-down timetable, even if in practice it is possible that some residual UNMIL presence 
might remain for the 2017 election process and its aftermath. 
Security concerns: At each instance during the visit by the new Special Representative of 
the Secretary-General (SRSG) in September this year and in view of timelines for the 
drawdown, Liberian officials have repeatedly voiced deep concerns about the capacity of 
security agencies in the rural counties and in Liberia at large, citing critical shortfalls in 
manpower and other resources. “We doubt their capacity to fill in the gap after UNMIL 
leaves,” Grand Gedeh Superintendent Peter L. Solo noted, recalling how recent cases of mob 
violence had severely challenged the strength of security forces in the county. For example, 
recent cases of insecurity include incidents, in which police units were stretched to breaking 
point as they scrambled reinforcements to contain a riot in the small and hard-to-reach gold 
mining camp of Bateljam.  
Thus the Security Council further adopted Resolution 2239 l at its 7525th meeting on 
September 17, 2015 giving UNMIL the mandate to assist Liberia implement the national 
strategy on the Security Sector Reform in accordance with its draw-down plan.  The mandate 
allows for UNMIL to advise the Liberian Government on security reform and the 
organization of the Liberia National Police (LNP), Bureau of Immigration, as well as the 
justice and correction sector. The Security Council emphasized that this mandate should be 
implemented in close coordination with bilateral and multilateral partners. 
While renewing the mandate, the Security Council urged the Government of Liberia to 
intensify its efforts toward achieving progress on the transition of security responsibilities 
from UNMIL to the national authorities. Particularly, the Government was encouraged to 
prioritize and resource the critical gaps in the capacity and capability of the Liberia National 
Police, the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization, and the justice sector. Doubts remain 
on the extent to which these critical security sector legislation; such as the Firearms and 
Ammunition Control Act, the Police Act, and the Immigration Service Act, will have been 
enacted in order to providing a robust legal framework for a smooth transition. Such progress 
is welcome, but it is important to recognise that the Liberia National Police still have low 
capacity, and even low presence in the counties away from Monrovia. Local traditional, 
customary or informal institutions in practice provide most policing functions at local levels, 
though these also can be weak or biased, and are vulnerable to manipulation by ruling elites 
or natural resource companies (national or international) 
UNMIL Deterrent effect: Further concerns in terms of security relate to those who may 
seize opportunities in the vacuum left. Many believe that UNMIL has served a valuable 
deterrent effect with regard to organized crime, and that their draw-down could result in an 
increase in Liberia as a trans-shipment point. Should this occur, government agencies will be 
hard pressed to cope; with Bureau for Immigration and Naturalization (BIN) staff, for 
example, stationed at borders unarmed, with limited training and often deployed in isolation 
limiting their ability to provide effective border security. The lack of a national drug law to 
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govern illicit drugs and weak capacity of the DEA to tackle trafficking and other related 
challenges presents difficulties for the GoL.   Reports indicated that there has been reported 
growing signs that drug trafficking, mob violence; extortions and security excess are on the 
increase and the UNMILs withdrawal  will only exacerbate the situation.  These security 
concerns have been noted as some of the cardinal issues that need to be addressed to sustain 
the fragile peace. 
Capacity gaps: There has been concerns raised about the capacity of not only the security 
services but also of the civilian staff—including those responsible for supporting important 
reforms including the forthcoming general elections and democratisation process.  These 
remain unlikely to be in place at the time withdrawal.  There is further lack of sufficient 
personnel, infrastructure and equipment required for successful implementation of the de-
concentration and decentralization initiatives. 
Border Insecurity/downsizing of UNOCI: Similarly, the potential for border insecurity to 
destabilise Liberia or Côte d’Ivoire has been mentioned in the reports of the Secretary-
General on UNMIL and UNOCI as well as in the various reports of the experts supporting the 
1521 Liberia and 1572 Côte d’Ivoire sanctions committees. On June 8, 2012, armed gunmen 
launched a raid across the Liberian border into Côte d’Ivoire, killing 7 UN Operations in Côte 
d’Ivoire (UNOCI) peacekeepers, and at least 8 civilians. As a result UNMIL began intense 
collaboration with UNOCI working together to ensure that the border remains secure. The 
result has been few major incidents of cross-border violence have occurred since. The 
concern is that as well the withdrawal of UNMIL, the UN mission in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) 
is also downsizing; this could increase the insecurity within the border regions.  Similarly, the 
ongoing crisis in Côte d’Ivoire adds to the existing challenges as the number of refugees 
entering, fleeing sporadic violence in Côte d’Ivoire continues to increase. Over 2,500 Ivorian 
refugees arrived in Liberia in 2013 alone (see sub-section on refugees). 
The drawdown of the UNMIL will leave the porous entry points of Liberian borders with 
Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast and Guinea, sparsely manned by Liberia security forces and with 
limited logistics to patrol the and address the issue of suspected traffickers and users. 
Containing prohibited drugs and usage in the country remains crucial to sustain peace.  
UNMIL’s withdrawal will expose Liberia’s vulnerability in this area. 
Economic gaps: The presence of UNMIL has undoubtedly contributed significantly to 
Liberian national GDP. In this context, UNMIL drawdown will have wider economic 
implications. More specifically, the reduction in UNMIL resources to support security 
services and capacities has already had serious implications for resourcing the Liberian 
national army and police. The GoL Economic Stabilization and Recovery Plan recognises  
there is a significant funding gap within the budgets for Agenda for Transformation, 
particularly in as far as developing Liberia’s capacity to deliver security following UNMIL’s 
drawdown. The ESRP notes that this is despite GoL having prioritized funding to this sector 
through the National Budget including for development and reform of the Judiciary. In 
response of the UN Security Council resolution the Government has developed its Plan for 
UNMIL Transition covering 15 institutions and 8 priority areas, with a total cost of US$104.8 
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million between FY2015/2016 and FY2017/2018. This includes a cost of US$76.2 million 
for FY2015/2016. In practice, it is very unclear that these funds will actually be delivered, or 
that they will be adequate to develop and maintain adequate policing and security across 
Liberia.  
Vulnerabilities arising from slow-down in Liberia’s National GDP growth 
In the context of the above comments on the economic impacts of UNMIL withdrawal it is 
important to return to the risks raised in an earlier section arising from the likely slow-down 
in Liberia’s national GDP growth, due to declines in global commodity prices. As noted 
above, the consistently high GDP growth rates of 5-10% have characterised Liberia’s post-
conflict economic recovery. Such growth is widely understood to have been driven by a 
combination of: international investments in natural resource extraction and commercial 
agriculture, international aid, and remittances. The reductions in global commodity prices are 
likely to substantially reduce these drivers. Although the links between this and levels of 
international aid and remittances are complex and unclear, at the least it appears unlikely that 
remittances or international aid to Liberia will increase over the next few years in ways that 
compensate for reductions in international natural resource investment or commodity prices. 
For example, levels of international aid to Liberia has been disproportionately high over the 
last decade compared to aid to most other developing fragile or conflict affected states, and 
are likely to decline from now on. Thus it is likely that Liberia’s GDP will grow only at a 
slow rate in the next few years, and there is possible a risk of decline.  
The implications of this economic slowdown for Liberian fragility and conflict risks are very 
unclear, but they can confidently be expected to be negative overall. They can be expected, 
for example, further to limit government resources available of reforms and improvements in 
government institutions and services. However, these have not made rapid progress even 
during the years of rapid GDP growth, a discussed above. Similarly, levels of poverty, 
unemployment and marginalisation remained stubbornly high in the context of high GDP 
growth. So it is possible that most ordinary Liberians will not be greatly directly affected.  
However, one clearly predictable implication of a slowdown in national GDP growth is that 
there is likely to be less resources available for governing elites to use for the purposes of 
clientalism, patronage, or management of interest group coalitions to maintain their 
acceptance of the present political settlement in Liberia. In principle, this could provide an 
important stimulus for efforts to clean-up Liberian governance systems, as for example it did 
in several South East Asian countries in the aftermath of their 1997 financial crises. However, 
it also tends to exacerbate the political and security risks discussed above in relation to the 
political transition during the 2017 election process and UNMIL drawdown. .    
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Overall Implications for Sweden’s future co-operation 
strategy and programmes in Liberia 
In developing its next strategy for development co-operation for Liberia, Sweden needs at 
least to fully take into account the on-going powerful set of conflict risk factors in Liberia  
This implies at minimum ensuring and promoting conflict sensitivity of all of the policies, 
programmes and activities that Sweden supports over the next five years. In this way, Sweden 
can not only reduce risks of unintentionally increasing insecurity of vulnerable groups; but 
also help to ensure that the range of its programmes contribute to human security at the same 
time as achieving their directly stated intended outcomes. 
It also implies a need to specifically aim to address factors contributing to state fragility as 
well as to poverty reduction and development. This implies learning lessons from the 
resilience of drivers of fragility over the past decades, and designing strategies, programmes 
and modes of engagement. This, for example, was a focus for the EU Donor workshop in 
Monrovia in January 2013, and the Helpdesk’s Workshop Report for this meeting (as 
referenced in the Mapping Annex and provided to the Swedish Embassy on 8 Nov 2015) 
provides many useful comments and suggestions relevant to this goal.    
The Helpdesk’s analysis that a strong case can be made that vulnerabilities to violent conflict 
could significantly increase during the next five years has wider implications. It implies that 
Sweden and its international and local partners need also to devote serious and enhanced 
attention to conflict prevention, peace-building, and confidence and security building 
measures. If this argument is accepted, it should have implications for Sweden’s strategy for 
development co-operation as well as for Sweden’s wider foreign and security policy 
engagement with Liberia. That is, it implies substantially increased prioritisation of conflict 
prevention measures targeted to mitigation the risks associated with UNMIL drawdown and 
the government transition associated with the 2017 elections (in the context of national 
economic slow-down).,   
Implications for Sweden’s future assistance to Liberia include consideration of active 
measures to:  
 maintain deterrence against instrumental use of armed violence and aim to maintain 
public confidence in overall security  during and after UNMIL drawdown; and  
 ensure security and prevent violence during elections, and help to prevent damaging 
fragmentation and division of governing networks in the post-2017 governance 
system while taking opportunities to further enhance accountability and the roles of 
legitimate state institutions and procedures in decisions on use of public funds and 
resources. 
The withdrawal or drawdown on UN Missions was the subject of the Peacebuilding 
Commission’s Working Group on Lessons Learned (WGLL) in 2014.  This working group 
focused its work programme on the issue of transition of UN missions to UN Country Teams, 
as a crucial phase in the transition from conflict to sustainable peace and have noted that there 
are challenges that may negatively affect these efforts, namely, 1) funding and technical 
capacity gaps for peacebuilding priorities; and 2) Sustaining inclusive political processes.  
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These and other concerns are some of the issues that SIDA and its donor partners need to be 
aware of whilst developing the next 5 year cooperation strategy for Liberia. 
Thus, it is important to review in detail the measures that are in place to manage the 
transitions associated with UNMIL drawdown, and to ensure that some capacities and 
mechanisms remain in place during the transition that adequately fills the gaps of UNMIL 
drawdown during the critical 2016-2018 period. This will involve clarifying the realities of 
the identification of, and efforts to address, such gaps. The available documents prepared for 
this purpose by UNMIL and the GoL in 2015 can be misleading – the gaps identified have 
been constructed through a complex inter-institutional and diplomatic process, and on closer 
attention may not adequately relate to the key issues and ‘gaps’ that need to be addressed to 
address key fragilities and conflict risks.  
 
Selected Conflict Risk Factors requiring particular attention in 
implementing Sweden’s future strategy 
In this section, we briefly discuss some selected issue areas to which we suggest that Sweden 
needs to devote particular attention when implementing Sweden new strategy for 
development co-operation with Liberia. As is clear from the outline of conflict risk factors in 
previous sub-sections, this is not a comprehensive set. Nevertheless we believe they are all 
particularly important in relation to ensuring conflict sensitivity, addressing drivers of 
fragility, and contributing to conflict prevention and resilience.  
In each sub-section, we briefly highlight the relevance to conflict risks and resilience, outline 
the situation and trends, and then briefly discuss possible implications for implementation of 
Sweden’s new strategy.  
Natural resource governance and managing land and resource-based conflicts 
peacefully 
This is a vital issue area for Sweden and its partners. It merits concerted attention, not only 
through dedicated programmes but also as a cross-cutting conflict sensitivity issue for all 
programmes. Amongst the top priorities are to aim to enhance mechanisms for peaceful 
management and settlement of land and natural resource disputes, to reduce violence and 
enhance human security throughout much of Liberia, and also contribute to wider conflict 
prevention in relation to the heightened conflict risks during 2016-2020 highlighted above,  
Liberia’s land and natural resource-related disputes were intrinsic to the civil wars. An 
estimated 800,000 people were displaced during Liberia’s 14 years of civil war. Following 
the ceasefire and signing of the CPA, many returned to their homes only to discover that their 
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land had been captured.
4
 These complex and land ownership disputes remain largely 
unresolved in the post-conflict context, and claims over land are in the views of most 
Liberians the primary source of social tensions in the country.
5
 Moreover, throughout the 
country’s history, natural resources and agricultural land have been largely under the control 
of foreign-owned companies. During the wars, successive regimes acquired and controlled 
land and resources, and closed special deals with foreign companies for the exploitation of 
natural resources that did not benefit the majority of the people.
6
  
According to PeacebuildingData.org
7
, 23 percent of the Liberian population has experienced 
some sort of land disputes after the end of the war. The study identified multiple forms of 
land conflicts with the most commonly reported issues being: land being taken over by 
someone else (land grabbing), with grabbing of house plots being more common than 
grabbing of farm land. A significant majority of respondents of the study (69 percent) 
perceived land disputes, commonly referred to as land palavas, to be much more frequent 
after the war compared to before the war. Additional common forms of land disputes include 
boundary conflicts, ownership conflicts linked to inheritance, ownership conflicts due to the 
lack of land registration and multiple sale of privately owned land by private individuals.  
The duality of legal systems pose added stress to the issue of land-disputes. Land laws are 
plagued not only by the duality of the system in which they operate but by the weakness of 
the state, through its judiciary, to be a platform of redress for complaints due to the heavy 
burden of caseloads and the lack of rural legal services.
8
 It is estimated that 90 percent of 
Liberia’s civil court cases are related to land, and land disputes are a major driver for over 60 
percent of violent conflicts in Liberia.
9
  
Customary land ownership rights have been largely inadequately recognised, clarified or 
respected throughout the country’s history, yet most rural Liberian’s have greater trust in the 
customary justice system compared to the formal system. Women traditionally have unequal 
rights to land compared to men in the statutory and customary land governance systems. 
Nevertheless, in 2003, Liberia passed a new inheritance law, which gives greater recognition 
                                                          
4
 Saa and WANEP Liberia Crises Prevention Department: Critical Questions and Responses on Land Reforms 
in Liberia, available from: 
http://www.wanep.org/wanep/files/2013/sept/critical_questions_on_land_reform_in_Liberia.pdf  
5
 USAID (2010): Liberia ICAF Report, May 2010.   
6
 Corporatejustice.org: Liberia back in Business? Conflicts and human rights issues in a post conflict 
environment, SOMO paper, July 2015. 
7
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8
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9
 Pichel, et. al. (2012): Implementing an Affordable, Rapid Deployment Land Records Management Solution for 
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to women’s property rights and provides for a wife to receive one third of her husband’s 
estate on his death, with the remainder passing to his children.
10
  
In August 2009, the Liberian National Land Commission was established with the mandate to 
propose, advocate and coordinate reforms of land policy, laws and programs in Liberia. In 
May 2013, the Commission had developed the country’s first-ever land rights policy, which 
clearly defines the various categories of land and accompanying rights and responsibilities, 
including for: Public Land, Government Land, Customary Land, and Private Land, as well as 
Protected Areas that will be conserved for the benefit of all Liberians. According to Focus on 
Land in Africa (December, 2013), the Policy includes some positive provisions that, if 
successfully implemented, could lead to significant improvements in  land governance in the 
country. For the implementation of the Policy to have meaningful positive change for 
women, the significant disparities and inconsistencies between civil law and custom law that 
governs women’s property rights need to be addressed.11 
Population growth, displacement and foreign investments in the extractive industry are also 
important factors driving land-disputes in the post conflict context. In the five years between 
2006 and 2011 the government granted over a third of the country’s lands to private investors 
which were earmarked for logging, mining and agro-industrial corporations (Crabtree-Condor 
and Casey 2012). CorporateJustice.org, identifies three categories of conflicts related to 
business activity in Liberia: (i) community-company conflicts regarding access to land, 
resettlement, loss of livelihoods and environmental concerns; (ii) inter and intra-community 
conflicts (as a result of pre-existing conflicts) regarding issues such as employment 
opportunities, community development projects and the question of who benefits from these 
investments, and (iii) state-community conflicts as a result of concessions to foreign 
companies and the state’s role in providing security services to these corporations and lack of 
capacity/political will to ensure proper implementation of concession agreements.
12
 
UNMIL’s progress report of February 2014 also noted that land concessions granted by the 
government to private companies “continue to provoke violent demonstrations”13, involving 
mobilization of large groups, “often armed with crude weapons”14.  
 
Risk, dilemmas and implications for Sweden’s’ development cooperation with Liberia 
Grievances over land and resources are among the root causes of conflict in Liberia and land-
related disputes continue being a primary source of social tensions in the post conflict 
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context. As identified by the International Alert (2011)
15
, land disputes risk becoming violent 
“when linked to wider processes of political exclusion, social discrimination, economic 
marginalisation, and a perception that peaceful action is no longer a viable strategy for 
change”. Many of these risk factors are identified in the Liberian post-conflict context. But 
people’s commitment to peaceful resolution of existing disputes has so far served as an 
important mitigating factor (easing the risk of large-scale conflict).  
As noted by the United Nations (2010)
16
, providing support to land dispute resolution is 
challenging in Liberia as the country has a high level of land tenure insecurity, weak legal 
and institutional frameworks and a rather fragile land administration system. In addition, 
dispute resolution is carried out by a large number of state and non-state actors. The Land 
Commission’s Dispute Resolution Program Initiative has in recent years rather successfully 
handled a number of land dispute cases, with the aim of developing alternative dispute 
resolution methods (including mediation, negotiation and arbitration) to reduce the number of 
incidents that may end up in court or may develop into violent conflicts.  
In light of the various factors driving land-disputes in the post conflict context, any support 
provided to agricultural development and business, including regional and international trade 
(i.e. cooperation area two of Sweden’s strategy with Liberia), as well as land governance and 
reform in Liberia needs to carefully consider both historic (unresolved land ownership 
disputes) and new forms of grievances (predominantly associated with investments in the 
extractive industry).  
Sida is recommended to conduct (or make use of existing reliable sources) political economy 
and power analysis of land ownership, land use and markets. In providing support to the 
broader land reform process, important conflict sensitivity considerations include ensuring 
inclusiveness of all stakeholders concerned.  
Moreover, we recommend that Sida, and the Swedish embassy, remain sceptical about the 
likely effectiveness of initiatives or programmes that aims to address and prevent land 
disputes primarily through measures to clarify or revise laws and regulations. Although such 
efforts can play important roles, it is important to recognise that in the Liberia context, any 
new land or natural resource rights law or regulation will remain highly contested. It is much 
more likely simply to add to the range of existing formal and customary bases for land rights 
claims, rather than replace them with a new and clearer one. In our judgement, the priority is 
to enhance availability and effectiveness of dispute-settlement through conflict resolution 
mechanisms, where disputing parties arrive at a mutually-acceptable and adequately just 
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outcome, rather than relying on legal or regulatory procedures which will remain corrupted 
and inefficient for the foreseeable future.   
Decentralization and deconcentration of services 
 
Politics in Liberia is historically highly centralized in the capital Monrovia and dominated by 
a political and economic elite. Local units of governance, such as counties and territories 
have been created, but most real power has remained at central level with the presidency.
17
 
Historical inequalities, and the political dominance of the Americo-Liberians at the expense 
of native population, are generally held as central root causes of the conflicts in Liberia. A 
decentralization process is therefore essential for securing long-term peace in the country. 
 
At the end of the civil war in 2003 governance reform was seen as a way to promote political 
participation and ownership across the country. The Governance Commission
18
 that was 
established under the peace agreement was mandated inter alia to: ‘ensure subsidiarity in 
governance through decentralization and participation.’19  In 2010 Liberia adopted a 
National Policy on Decentralization and Local Governance (NPDLG). The policy calls for 
decentralization and transfer of substantial political, fiscal and administrative powers to local 
governments. In 2013, the GoL approved, with international donor support, a national 
implementation plan for decentralisation of aspects of governance authority to country levels 
and for deconcentration of service delivery. Both the NPDLG and the Local Government Act 
were drafted in the context of substantial consultations within Liberia, led by the Governance 
Commission with support from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Law Reform Commission 
and development partners.
20
 Implementation has been postponed by the Ebola epidemic, but 
in late 2015 is now resuming. 
 
As noted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), for example, decentralisation in Liberia 
is due to takes place in two ways: i) devolution of political and decision-making power to 
locally-elected officials; and ii) ‘deconcentration’, giving decision-making power to officials 
station at local level, but appointed by the centre.
21
 The agreed decentralization reforms in 
Liberia have mainly been ‘deconcentration’ of power, and local officials have been appointed 
to and answered to superiors in Monrovia. Efforts to extend state authority, including the 
Justice and Security Hubs discussed under the Access to Justice section of this report, fall 
into this category.  
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It is also telling that when stakeholders in Liberia (local government officials, chiefs, civil 
society actors and academics) were asked what they thought about decentralization, most 
respondents reflected on decentralisation in terms of development and access to services, 
rather than as political empowerment.
22
 The decentralization of government functions and 
services is important and a central component of repairing and building trust between the 
government and the population. This does not, however, truly empower people politically.  
 
Once the Act is adopted, there are several outstanding issues regarding its implementation. 
There are, for example, still questions concerning the right to stand for local election 
(political parties or independent candidates), harmonisation of administrative district 
boundaries affecting the current system of chieftaincy, and the inclusion of seats reserved for 
women and youth in local governance structures.
23
 
 
Political decentralization – or devolution – is a longer-term process, and there are a number 
of difficult challenges that still need to be overcome in Liberia in this regard. The adoption of 
the Local Governance Act is key step in the process (currently pending introduction by the 
President to the Legislature).  
 
There is wide agreement, however, that one of the major challenges is that the Act will 
require changes to the Constitution of Liberia: “New elements, such as the creation of county 
councils, will need to be added, as well as the election of local government officials 
(superintendent and district commissioner), curtailing the current power of the president to 
appoint them.”24 A USAID assessment report from 2012 noted that one of the main 
constraints in relation to the decentralization process is “the Legislature and its willingness to 
vote for the public good”, and that the authors of the report “questioned whether incentives 
exist for legislators to pass the Law, approve the contents of the referendum or sign-off on the 
results if it does not promote their personal rather than public interest. “25 
 
The USAID assessment concluded, however, that: “there is considerable reason to believe 
that political decentralization has the commitment of the country’s leaders and its people. 
Overcoming entrenched interests that have burrowed into the body politic over generations 
will not be easy to overcome but there are champions […] in and out of government that must 
be mobilized into a broad-based constituency for decentralization reform.” 26 The assessment 
further noted that because politicians (the supply side) are primarily driven by preserving 
privileges and power, the success in political decentralization will depend on mobilisation 
and demands form an informed public (the demand side), which points to a need for 
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enhanced efforts to raise awareness about the political rights and obligations of the 
citizenry.
27
 
 
The decentralization process has been seen as an opportunity for Liberian women to gain 
greater access to political life and decision-making, and both the Decentralization Policy and 
the draft Local Government Act include gender equity measures reserving two seats in every 
County Council for women. A joint study by the Governance Commission, the Ministry of 
Gender and Development, and UN Women (2014) held that: “If implemented in a gender-
responsive manner, decentralization provides and unprecedented opportunity for women to 
compete for positions in local government and to influence planning, policy and budget 
decision-making processes.” 28  
A number of analysts agree that there is a need for significant capacity building of the civil 
service at both central and local levels in order to achieve responsive and accountable local 
governance structures in Liberia. There is also agreement on the need for enhanced efforts to 
raise the awareness of the general public, both relating to the on-going reform efforts and, 
more long-term, on the rights and obligations of citizens in the democratic process.
29
 
Overall, the Helpdesk’s assessment is that this programme of decentralisation of governance 
and deconcentration of service delivery is important and greatly to be welcomed from a 
conflict and fragility perspective. If it is well implemented on a conflict sensitive way, it could 
help to reduce the drivers of fragility and conflict risk factors considerably. But it also has 
the potential to increase such risks if it is not implemented in a conflict sensitive way. Any 
such reform provides opportunities for local elites to consolidate or challenge for power or 
local wealth, as well as providing opportunities for more inclusive, accountable and 
responsive local governance. There is also the risk that such decentralisation processes could 
be instrumentalised by powerful actors in struggles for power associated with the government 
transition in 2017 in the context of UNMIL drawdown. It is also important to note that there 
are potentially powerful de facto links between the ways in which decentralisation processes 
are implemented and prospects for improved natural resource governance and management of 
land disputes.   
 
At present, the Helpdesk assesses that insufficient attention is being devoted to mitigating 
such risks of conflict insensitive decentralisation and deconcentration processes. This 
implication is that Sweden needs to ensure that it has the local contextual information and 
systems to ensure that all of the programmes that it supports engage with the decentralisation 
process in a way that it at least conflict sensitive and preferably directly helps to contribute 
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to local dispute settlement and conflict prevention, In addition, Sweden could usefully 
consider ways of promoting such attention from all other international donor partners.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Security Sector Reform and Access to Justice  
 
The formal justice system in Liberia has been shaped of the political history of the country, 
with centralization of power to elites in the capital, patronage and endemic corruption. The 
system of justice in Liberia broke down completely during the 14 years of civil war. In the 
first comprehensive post-conflict assessment of the justice sector, conducted by the 
International Legal Assistance Consortium in 2003, it was held that: “There is an almost 
unanimous distrust of the legal system and a corresponding collapse of the rule of law.”30 It 
is important to note that the system had significant weaknesses also in pre-war Liberia. An 
International Crisis Group (ICG) report from 2006 held that. “Even before the conflict, the 
justice system suffered from a historical lack of independence from the executive and failed to 
operate as an impartial forum since access to it was dependent on economic or social 
capital.“31 The lack of access to justice in the country is closely linked with the root causes of 
conflict and fragility in the Liberian context. 
 
The formal court system in Liberia consists of some 350 Magistrate Courts (court of first 
instance) across the country. The ILAC assessment from 2003 found that only about ten of 
the magistrates in these 350 courts had any form of formal legal education. Legal textbooks 
and case law were not available in local courts and throughout the years of conflict, 
magistrates had not been paid salary, which had led to widespread corruption and ‘highest-
bidder justice’. In areas where there are no magisterial courts, there are so called Justices of 
the Peace Courts with jurisdiction over a limited number of criminal and civil cases. Justices 
of the Peace are not employees of the state and not required to be legally trained. They are 
generally paid through fines paid by litigants in the courts.
32
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Some progress has been made through large investments and development programmes in the 
justice sector by the international community since the end of the conflict, access to formal 
justice in Liberia is still weak and the lack of trust in the system prevails. The 2014 Human 
Rights Watch World Report (the latest one available for Liberia) holds that: “Persistent 
weaknesses in the judiciary undermined access to justice and due process. Prolonged pre-
trial detention is prevalent; fair and speedy trials are rare. The judiciary is able to conclude 
only a small number of cases every year. Poor management of the judiciary and corrupt 
practices by judges, jurors, ministry administrators, and others also severely undermine the 
dispensation of justice.”33 
 
Formal national courts have never been a part of the social fabric in rural Liberia, and 
traditional justice mechanisms are still the preferred forum for resolving disputes for most 
Liberians. The United States Institute of Peace (USIP) found in a comprehensive study in 
2009 that: “Affordability, accessibility, and timeliness are three of the most consistent 
demands that Liberians have when it comes to the provision of justice. Our research reveals 
that the formal justice system is seen almost universally by Liberians as falling abysmally 
short of their expectations in all three of these important service categories.”34 
 
Traditional courts are formally recognised in the Liberian Constitution and in other national 
legislation. The recognition requires the traditional courts to apply Liberian national laws, but 
it is clear that other justice traditions and practices are widely used, sometimes contrary to 
fundamental human rights principles. In theory, it is possible to appeal decisions from 
traditional courts to the formal justice system, but in practice there are very few cases of 
appeal. The jurisdiction of traditional courts does not include serious criminal cases, and 
according to the USIP study referenced above, this limitation is generally respected. 
 
The USIP study noted that of criminal cases “only 2 percent were taken to a formal court; 45 
percent to an informal forum; and 53 percent to no forum at all”, and out of examined civil 
cases “only 3 percent were taken to a formal court; 38 percent to an informal forum; and 59 
percent to no forum at all”35 The study further holds that Liberians felt that the formal system 
was both ineffective and inaccessible, and prohibitively expensive for regular Liberians. 
There was a strong feeling that the justice system was geared towards defending the 
privileges of elites and that there was “no justice for the poor”.36 One of the most interesting 
findings of the USIP study from 2009, however, was that most Liberians were believed to 
favour the informal justice system even if the formal system were to deliver timely, 
affordable and impartial results. The reason for this was held to be the differences in the 
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foundational principles of justice underpinning the formal system (individual rights, 
adversarial process, and punitive sanctions), differ considerably from the perceptions of 
justice held by most Liberians. Traditional views of justice in Liberia are more focused on 
repairing social relations and achieving reconciliation. The helpdesk has not found any 
updated data on the use of informal versus formal forums of justice, but it is reasonable to 
assume that the ratio has not changed dramatically since 2009. 
 
Access to justice for women is particularly weak in Liberia. Sexual and Gender-Based 
Violence (SGBV) is highly prevalent also in post-conflict Liberia. There are weaknesses in 
the formal legal framework relating to the protection of women, particularly against violence 
and abuse in within the family. As outlined in the gender section of this report, there are no 
laws criminalizing domestic violence, sexual harassment or female genital mutilation. 
Referring to a 2010 joint study by the Government of Liberia and the UN, Caparini notes that 
one third of all reported SGBV-cases are never forwarded by the police to the magisterial- or 
circuit courts.
37
 Special units within the police (WACPS) and a special court for SGBV-cases 
have been established in Liberia. The capacity of the court is limited, however, and it 
currently only has jurisdiction in Montserrado County. The Liberian Ministry of Justice has 
also created an SGBV Crimes Unit to support the specialised court and the WACPS in 
investigating and prosecuting SGBV-crimes.  
 
Women are also particularly vulnerable in traditional justice processes where conservative 
views of women and traditional practices prevail, and progress made in the formal legal 
system is not automatically integrated in traditional processes. Whereas traditional processes 
can supplement the formal system and enhance access to justice for large groups of Liberians, 
it is essential that processes are closely monitored and that integration of principles of rights 
and gender equality is promoted. 
 
Trends and development of the issue in the post-conflict context 
Given the state of the formal justice system in post-conflict Liberia, it is obvious that change 
was going to take a long time and require substantial resources. International actors, 
including ILAC and its member organisations, the Carter Centre, and the UNDP Justice and 
Security Programme, have made significant efforts to train magistrates and provide materials 
to courts. The Supreme Court of Liberia also established a Judicial Training institute in 2008, 
with the support of ILAC and the American Bar Association. The first 60 magistrates 
graduated from the one-year training programme at the Institute in November 2011.
38
 The 
Institute has since engaged in various capacity building efforts for the judiciary and is 
currently reported to be in a process of recruiting for a second round of formal training.
39
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Significant international support has also been directed towards reforming and training 
Liberian Police, particularly through the engagement of UNMIL. After the conflict, a vetting 
process reduced the number of police officers to fewer than 1,000 (partially by excluding 
individuals who had committed human rights violations during the war). By February 2014 
there were 4,573 Liberian police officers and another 1,000 waiting to be trained (which is a 
significant improvement but still short of the 8,000 estimated to be necessary given Liberia’s 
current population of some 4 million).
40
 There are still, however, considerable problems 
associated with police conduct: “Widespread police indiscipline and corruption continue to 
compromise equal and impartial justice and the establishment of the rule of law. Liberian 
police officers routinely demand bribes and participate in extortion schemes. Members of two 
armed units […] regularly engage in armed robbery and other criminal acts during 
patrols.”41  
 
In an attempt to enhance access to formal justice institutions in rural Liberia, a regional 
Justice and Security hub-system has been created. The hubs comprise armed police officers, 
immigration units, and judges and are to be located in five regional centres outside of 
Monrovia. The first Justice and Security Hub opened in Gbarnga, in Bong County, in 2013. A 
study conducted a year after the creation of the hub concluded that the initiative had indeed 
helped enhance the presence and response of the national police outside Monrovia, whereas 
other expected benefits had not yet materialized. Particularly, the project had been hampered 
by persisting lack of resources. As in the rest of the country, the study held that: “Liberians 
who have been victims of crime are required to pay fees at virtually every step of the criminal 
justice process.”42 Informal fees are used both for personal gain (petty corruption) – to 
supplement income of police of court officials – but also to cover basic costs of carrying out 
basic duties such as fuel and transportation costs, or photocopying records. 
 
In the next phase, two additional Hubs will be set up, one in Harper and one in Zwedru. 
Based on the lessons from the first Hub, the implementation of the two new Hubs will focus 
more on service delivery and less on infrastructure.
43
 
 
Risk, dilemmas and implications for Sweden’s’ development cooperation with Liberia 
Despite a decade of international and national efforts to strengthen the justice system in 
Liberia, access to formal justice processes remains weak and limited to the main cities. The 
linkages between lack of access to justice in general and risks of violent conflict and 
insecurity are well recognised and documented. In Liberia, the limitations in the formal 
justice system and the lack of trust among Liberians in the state administered justice, is 
closely linked with historical inequalities and root causes of conflict. 
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As was shown in the USIP study from 2009, the considerable lack of trust in the formal 
justice system in Liberia has practical as well as cultural reasons. The duality of the justice 
system, whereby the traditional courts are formally recognised, is a constructive way of 
extending access to justice in rural areas, and mitigating the significant conflict risks 
associated with widespread perceptions of the formal justice system as a tool for the 
privileged to control and oppress the poor. There needs, however, to be close monitoring and 
effective oversight of these justice processes. Building inter alia on the interesting research 
conducted by USIP, as well as on experiences from local level peacebuilding and conflict 
prevention efforts, more could be done to find synergies and linkages between traditional and 
formal justice processes. It is important to engage in these processes with a high degree of 
cultural sensitivity, particularly in relation to local perceptions of justice. Adversarial court 
processes might actually be seen as exacerbating rather than resolving conflicts in and 
between communities. 
Engaging in support directed at strengthening the ‘formality’ of the traditional justice 
processes also holds potential to promote greater gender equality in rural Liberia. There are 
positive experiences from involving women in local peacebuilding and conflict resolution 
structures in rural Liberia, for example through projects implemented by Kvinna till Kvinna 
and local partners. In relation to women’s rights, it will also be central to continue promote 
legal reform processes to ensure full protection of women’s rights under the national laws of 
Liberia, and to continue support to women’s organisations advocating for change. 
The regional Justice and Security Hubs have the potential to extend the reach of the formal 
justice system beyond urban areas. There are important lessons to be learned from the first 
Hub in Gbarnga. Among the most important are ensuring that the Hubs focus on service 
delivery rather than infrastructure (which is being addressed in the second phase), ensuring 
sufficient resources for transports, equipment and salaries for police and other officials, 
basing implementation on a thorough analysis of local needs and perceptions of justice, and 
effective outreach and engagement with communities in the relevant areas to ensure a local 
understanding of the Hub and available services. As noted in Mariana Caparini’s study of the 
pilot Hub, the structures could also be used to promote synergetic linkages between the 
formal and traditional justice systems.
44
 
Overall, our assessment is that Sweden’s established support for capacity-building and 
reforms to formal policing and justice institutions remain well-justified, and should form an 
important part of its programming under Human Security issue area. As at present, these 
should aim to combine programmes for wider institutional reform and capacity building with 
more targeted interventions to enhance policing services and access to justice for vulnerable 
women.   
However, a major priority over the next five years is to improve dispute settlement, access to 
justice and policing services for communities in the counties beyond Monrovia, particularly 
those in the border regions. This is not only important because of the high insecurity and 
inadequate access to justice for almost all sectors of the populations in these areas. It is also 
because of the importance to conflict prevention in these counties and border regions. For 
example, as argued in an early section of this report, there are major risks that powerful 
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Liberian actors may consider breaking from, or testing, the present Liberian settlement, and if 
they choose to do so, they are likely to be tempted to take advantage of insecurity or violent 
land disputes to provoke or use instability of conflict in the border regions or rural areas for 
wider political purposes. In order to be effective, initiatives to enhance policing or peaceful 
dispute settlement systems in the counties beyond Monrovia and its hinterland should focus 
particularly on enhancing local customary and informal policing and justice institutions, and 
on improving their linkages with emerging formal state institutions – if the aim is to impact 
on actual police and justice delivery within a few years. 
 
Ethnicity, Societal divisions and conflict resolution priorities 
Ethnic tensions that arose through the semi-colonization process have been central to 
Liberia’s recent legacy of civil conflict. A small Liberian elite of American descendants (the 
Americo-Liberians) has dominated society and instituted a political system effectively 
excluding Liberia’s other 16 main ‘indigenous’ ethnic groups from political decision-making, 
power and resources. Americo-Liberians also became a cultural elite to the detriment of 
‘native’ Liberians. Perceptions of historic injustices and inter-ethnic tensions grew and 
culminated in a military coup, led by indigenous leader, Samuel K. Doe in 1980. Internal 
unrest and opposition to the new military regime grew steadily and lead to the outbreak of the 
first tribal and civil war in 1989.  
Doe’s Khran tribe began fighting other tribes, in particular Gio (or Dan) and Mano tribes in 
the north and in Nimba County in the northeast of Liberia. Doe’s Armed Forces of Liberia, 
however, quickly lost control of most of the country to Taylor’s NPFL, and the war 
developed into a multi-dimensional power struggle between a number of rebel and non-rebel 
factions.
45
 The war was characterised by widespread ethnic-based killings, particularly 
directed at the political opposition to the government. The short post-war period after the first 
Liberian war (1989-1996) failed largely due to continued ethnic scapegoating, the severe 
human rights abuses by the Taylor regime and the regime’s failure to tackle social and 
economic inequalities.
46
 
The second civil war came to an end with the signing of the Accra Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA) in 2003. The agreement called for power-sharing and created a National 
Transitional Government (NTG), consisting of 76 members: 12 each from the three warring 
parties; 18 from political parties; seven from civil society and special interest groups; and one 
from each of Liberia's 15 counties.  
The CPA also established a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in 2006. TRC’s 
final report of 2009 constitutes an important account of the numerous human rights violations 
and war crimes committed during the civil war. On the issue of accountability, the report 
includes four sub-sections of recommendations: Extraordinary Criminal Court for Liberia, 
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domestic criminal prosecution, public sanctions, and the National Palava Hut Program. 
However, the TRC faced numerous challenges in its operation, including limited technical 
capacity, poorly coordinated programming, and disharmony among its commissioners, and 
these organisational weaknesses are reflected in the commission’s final report, according to 
the International Centre for Transitional Justice (May 2010).
47
 
 
Trends and development of the issue in the post-conflict context 
In March 2013, Liberia developed a strategic Roadmap for National Healing, Peacebuilding 
and Reconciliation. The roadmap established an 18 month-plan towards: (a) fostering more 
coherent institutions and systems; (b) supporting national healing and reconciliation; and (c) 
strengthening efforts towards sustainable peace. According to a case study on the 
implementation of the Roadmap for National Healing, Peacebuilding and Reconciliation 
(June 2014), intra-communal cohesion and trust has not yet been achieved. According to the 
report, reform and conflict resolution mechanisms at the local and national levels have not 
adequately addressed issues of inter-ethnic, inter-religious and inter-generational tensions 
over key conflict drivers such as natural resource management and land access and 
management.
48
  
Nevertheless, a nationwide survey carried out by the University of Berkeley in 2011
49
 found 
that the issue of ethnicity is not necessarily regarded as a key driver for conflict and fragility 
amongst Liberians today. The study found that, although 40 per cent of the population 
identified ethnic divisions as one the causes of the civil war, only 4 per cent found it to be a 
current source of insecurity.  The same survey went on to find that 89 per cent of respondents 
described their relationship with other ethnic groups as good or very good and 95 per cent 
stated that they would not take issue with their relatives marrying someone from another 
ethnicity. Other analyses tend to re-inforce this general assessment 
This does not mean that ethnicity is not a political or conflict issue in contemporary Liberia, 
but rather that it is not today a primary driver for conflict. Ethnic tensions could well come 
back to the fore as a consequence of other issues not being addressed, and are highly 
vulnerable to exploitation by any groups that try to test or de-stabilise the current Liberian 
political settlement in 2017 or beyond.  
The Berkeley survey identified greed and corruption (at 63 per cent) as the main issues 
plaguing the country today.
50
 When ethnic problems were reported they were framed within a 
context of perceived violence from the other group or pre-existing hatred from the other 
ethnic group, pointing to ethnicity being a secondary driver, which is activated by and 
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coupled to a primary one.
51
 Particularly land conflicts have the potential to exacerbate ethnic 
tensions.  
Risks, dilemmas and implications for Sweden’s’ development cooperation with Liberia 
As noted above, a number of important challenges linked to ethnic identities and inequalities 
remain in the post-conflict context. On-going social disputes are, to some extent, underpinned 
by divisive historical identities, excluding various groups in society from full participation in 
peacebuilding, reconciliation, political processes and economic activities.  As noted in 
Liberia’s Agenda for Transformation (AfT), the country’s political system “must continue to 
develop and mature so that political parties can work together and demonstrate multipartite 
commitment to advance dialogue and joint action for reconciliation (…)52. At the community 
level, alternative dispute resolution mechanisms to handle land and civil disputes need to be 
further strengthened, together with the national Palaver Huts program (as recommended by 
the TRC’s final report).  The AfT further notes that: “True reconciliation in Liberia is 
currently hindered by inadequate accountability for human rights violations committed 
during the civil war (…).”53  
 
In light of the above, prevailing horizontal inequalities among (ethnic) groups in various 
spheres of society including social, economic and political, is identified as a risk to peace and 
stability in Liberia. A joint report by the United Nations Peacebuilding support office and 
Saferworld (2013)
54
 presents evidence of the effect that various types of horizontal 
inequalities have on violent conflict that is relevant to the Liberian post-conflict context. 
Most importantly, the study highlights that horizontal inequalities become particularly 
important as drivers of conflict when a number of these dimensions (i.e. economic, social, 
political, cultural, security or justice) coincide, as in the case of Liberia. Horizontal 
inequalities as a potential conflict driver can be effectively mitigated by providing support to 
strengthening the relations among groups, thereby mitigating divisions that can lead to 
violence. In this sense, Sida should continue to give priority to interventions underpinned by 
the principles of inclusion, fairness, responsiveness and accountability to all social groups.   
 
Gender inequalities and GBV 
 
During both periods of civil war in Liberia, all factions, including rebel and non-rebel armed 
groups, committed serious human rights abuses and war crimes against civilians, in particular 
against women and girls. Women and girls were targets of rape and other forms of SGBV, 
and these atrocities continue to be a serious problem facing women and girls in post-conflict 
Liberia.  
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A WHO survey found that almost 94 per cent of women and girls from six of Liberia’s 15 
counties had experienced some form of sexual abuse.
55
 Today, close to 40 per cent who are 
married or living with a partner have experienced sexual or physical abuse from their 
partner.
56
 Moreover, Female genital mutilation (FGM) is one of the most significant harmful 
cultural practices in Liberian society. It is commonly practiced through the so-called bush 
societies (most notably the Sande society).
57
 
 
Throughout the post-war period, the Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Protection 
(MoGCSP) has played a key role by developing a number of important national gender 
policies, action plans and procedures that aim to facilitate the prevention of and response to 
sexual violence in Liberia. In 2009 it launched the National Gender Policy
 
promoting gender 
equality and gender-mainstreaming in national development processes. The MoGCSP also 
developed the national Gender‐ Based Violence Plan of Action (GBV‐ PoA).
 
This plan sets 
out to achieve an integrated national protection system that will address GBV, including 
sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA). The objective was to reduce GBV by 30% by 2011 and 
to provide appropriate care and services to survivors of GBV. There is a general lack of 
verifiable data on GBV, but many studies note with concern that the act seem to be 
increasing.
58
 In 2009, the MoGCSP also developed standard operating procedures (SOPs) for 
preventing and responding to GBV at the national level. It also developed County‐ specific 
SOPs for addressing GBV at the County level.
59
 
 
In 2012, the Agenda for Transformation was adopted, which is Liberia’s medium-term 
economic growth and development strategy for the period 2012-2017. Gender equality and 
child protection are cross-cutting issues of the agenda, which includes a number of important 
pillars, such as, peace, justice, security and rule of law, etc.
60
 
 
Rape is an illegal act in Liberia, but remains to be a serious and persistent problem. The 
Liberian legal system has no laws criminalizing domestic violence, sexual harassment or 
female genital mutilation (the prevalence of which is estimated at 58 per cent
61
).  However, a 
draft domestic violence bill has been developed and is awaiting approval by the legislature.  
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Liberia suffers from a significant lack of resources, together with inadequately sustained 
political will, to ensure effective implementation of these gender-sensitive policies. 
Inadequate resources was identified as one of the main challenges to achieving a gender-
inclusive SSR process in the Civil Society Monitoring report on the implementation of 
UNSCR 1325 in 2011
62
. Additional important challenges include: limited access to remote 
areas; lack of logistical support in certain security institutions; low attendance by senior 
officers in security institutions to gender-related meetings and trainings; limited recruitment 
of qualified women in various security institutions; and limited monitoring and evaluation of 
activities.
63
 Moreover, socio-cultural norms and attitudes towards gender is a strong factor 
contributing to persistent high levels of GBV. These norms and attitudes place the male at the 
head of the household and serves as the model for organizing society—its economy, politic 
and socio-cultural life.  Male partners or husbands often restrict women’s civil liberties and 
their active participation in society. For example, a quarter of women have reported that they 
are not given permission to visit female friends and 12 per cent have had contact with their 
families curtailed.
64
 
 
Under President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, women have gained more influential positions, for 
example several women have been appointed to official government positions traditionally 
held by men. This marks some important progress. But women’s representation in politics in 
Liberia is still significantly below the average in the Sub-Saharan region. Moreover, it is 
important to point out that these women have been appointed by the government, and that 
support for women’s participation in politics among the Liberian public remains rather weak. 
The re-election of Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf in 2011 was also followed by a decrease in the 
number of ministerial positions held by women. Women in the legislature also decreased 
from 17 to 13 out of the total 94 seats.
65
 These worrying trends after the 2017 elections could 
continue unless preventive measures are taken by women’s’ coalitions in Liberia, supported 
by Sweden and other donors.  
 
Risk, dilemmas and implications for Sweden’s’ development cooperation with Liberia 
Several studies have found strong correlation between countries ‘peacefulness’ and their 
levels of gender equality. While most evidence focus on the impact of conflict on gender 
inequality, inequality (between genders and social groups) is also described as a structural 
risk factor for conflict and fragility. Thus, gender inequality, conflict and violence tend to be 
mutually reinforcing.
66
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In the Liberian context, evidence suggests “gender inequality and sexual violence were key 
motivating factors for female combatants during civil wars in those countries”67. Patriarchal 
gender norms, which lie at the heart of gender inequality, continue being a risk factor for 
instability in Liberia, which together with other interrelated triggers could fuel new cycles of 
violence in the country. 
  
 
In light of the above, continuous exclusion/insufficient inclusion of men in addressing GBV 
and supporting women’s participation in society, could have long-term negative implications 
for peace and stability in Liberia. Development interventions need to increasingly consider 
men’s strong resistance towards change (i.e. women’s empowerment) and the reasons behind 
these prevailing attitudes. This concerns the broader women’s empowerment agenda, but in 
particular with regards to specifically cultural sensitive issues such as the practice of FGM, 
which is strongly supported by both men and women and different levels of society.  
Another commonly identified reason why women in Liberia were not been able to capitalize 
on the empowerment experienced through their active involvement in bringing an end to the 
conflict, is the weak involvement of rural women in the peace process and in the post-conflict 
recovery. Women’s participation in politics, and in society broadly, is limited very to a small 
elite in the capital. This contributes to prevailing inequalities and fragmentation within the 
Liberian women’s movement. In mitigating the risk of continuous inequalities and division 
among women (and various social groups), Sida should consider to further increase the focus 
on rural and remote areas – and identifying linkages with the national policy level – in its 
development cooperation with Liberia.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
In the context of continuing fragility of Liberia, and substantial and increasing risks of violent 
conflict during the 2016-2017 combination of national election processes, UNMIL 
drawdown, and a more severe external economic context, Sweden’s new cooperation strategy 
for Liberia over the next 5 years needs not only to ensure and promote conflict sensitivity of 
the programmes that it and its partners support in Liberia, but also to enhance their focus on 
more directly supporting conflict prevention and ‘pathways out of fragility’.  
These wider implications for Sweden’s co-operation strategy and programmes for the next 
five years are elaborated in the relevant section of this Report above. In the subsequent 
Section examining in more detail several selected conflict risks factors, we have identified 
and discussed implications and recommendations for future Swedish programming in more 
detail for each of the selected issue area in turn.  
In this context, our overall conclusion is that the proposed new ‘Human Security’ Results 
Area of Sida-supported programing in Liberia is much needed and highly justified. Moreover, 
it needs not only to help to promote human security of specific vulnerable sectors of the 
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population, including women, but also to carefully and determinedly priorities the sets of 
issue identified in this report as priorities for managing and addressing fragility and 
promoting conflict prevention. In this context, there are important synergies and cross-cutting 
issues with the other two proposed Results Areas. Moreover, it is important for Sweden to 
adopt a highly political and conflict prevention and security-oriented approach alongside 
developmental approaches, linking Sida’s financial or capability-building programme support 
with diplomatic, political and security engagements. The Swedish embassy has been taking 
this approach already, but it needs to be re-inforced over the next challenging five years.   
 
 
